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ABSTRACT. The paper raises a conceptual issue in the study of culture which, 
it is argued, has major impact on contemporary European political and legal 
landscape.  The point concerns the epistemological problem of positioning 
theory vis à vis its own objects.  Specifically, when the object at stake is the 
phenomenon of socio-cultural diversity, the question is whether, and to which 
extent, theory, as well as normative discourse, are in themselves part of such 
diversity.  Most academic discourse aims at positioning itself on a distinct – 
usually conceived of as more general – level than the objects it strives to 
explain.  The same holds for most normative European philosophical and legal 
discourses vis-à-vis the subjects they claim to apply to.  Hence, the question can 
be articultated as follows: is theory at the service of one of the Weberian 
warring gods, or is it a sine ira nec studio view over the world?  Interestingly, 
these two alternative views can, in their turn, be understood either as 
descriptions of the actual relationship between theory and objects, or as 
prescriptions about the correct way to imagine the proper role of theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Conceptualizing culture, conceptualizing theory 
The title of our session, ‘Theorizing Culture’, invites, to my mind, not only to 
conceptualize culture, but also, I think, to conceptualize theory, or, in other 
words, to face the epistemological problem of the positioning theory vis à vis its 
 2 
own objects. Indeed, just as culture, theory, too, can be seen as an inherently 
boundary-making as well as bridge-making activity. Both culture and theory 
involve territorial devices and territorial linkages, at least if we understand 
territory as a relational structure. This means that culture and theory make (or 
remake, or attempt at making) territories of relationships, which bound some 
together and bridge to some others. Such boundaries and bridges may of course 
be consensual or conflictual, they may define acceptance or rejection, hierarchy 
or coarchy. Yet, when seen from this perspective, a fundamental difference also 
appears between culture and theory. Whereas talks about culture usually evoke 
subject-to-subject relationships, talks about theory evoke subject-to-object 
relationships. 
 
In particular, when the theoretical objects at stake are phenomena such as 
cultural change and socio-cultural diversity in the construction of Europe, the 
question becomes whether theory itself is part of such diversity or whether, on 
the contrary, theory lays on a distinct layer. If the latter is the case, it is 
generally assumed that theory is more abstract and encompassing than the 
objects it strives to explain. To frame our question in a Weber-like terminology, 
is theory at the service of one of the warring gods, or is it a sine ira nec studio 
regard over the world? Or even: which is the degree of autonomy of 
sociological theory, seen as a scientific field, from the social field where the 
production of such theory is embedded? 
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Both alternative views of theory, as located alternatively over or among its 
objects, can, in their turn, be understood as either descriptions of the actual 
relationship between theory and objects, or prescriptions about the correct way 
to imagine its most proper and suitable role. This said, we find ourselves at the 
outset of the problem: how to think of, how to conceive and describe the nature 
of multiplicity in the European society and the European culture?  
 
To put it simply, the answer is of course a matter of points of view and, above 
all, a matter of taste (Feyerabend has become famous for claiming that science 
at large is a matter of taste). Yet, as matters of taste become history, they also get 
caught in complex social power relationships. The birth of sociology as a 
discipline was marked by an epistemological break away from common sense 
and intuitive knowledge. An attempt was made at separating etic from emic 
categories, scientific categories from native categories. Durkheim (1894) first 
lamented the fact that the problem with doing sociology is that everybody 
thinks s/he can be a sociologist. It was thus necessary for him to distinguish 
sociological knowledge from the layperson’s knowledge, to build a specific 
methodological and conceptual apparatus which could guarantee the 
independence of sociology from other forms of knowledge about society. This is 
clearly a territorial issue in the ethological sense of the word, and possibly – as I 
hinted at before – the whole history of scientific disciplines may be written as a 
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territorial history. Along a Durkheimian line of thought, we arrive at the idea 
that socio-cultural diversity qua multiplicity must be described by a theory of 
cultural pluralism, or a theory of multiculturalism. We may call this a scientistic 
position. 
 
Do people who are part of cultural multiplicity have a saying in how a theory of 
multiculturalism should look like, how the units, the building blocks of 
multiplicity are defined, where group boundaries are drawn and even what is 
the nature of such boundaries? From a scientistic perspective, I am afraid not: 
indeed, they seem to have none. In this respect, what the scientistic view 
overlooks – or hides – is that theory-making is in itself a practice. It is a social 
and cultural practice. When we ask ‘who are the subjects of socio-cultural 
pluralism’, we raise not only a sociological question, which points to the 
description of the social world, but also a question of sociology, which points to 
the epistemological standpoint we have adopted to look at multiplicity. This is 
the reason why some have called for a ‘second epistemological break’ (Bourdieu 
1997), which would mark a separation, not from lay knowledge, but from the 
academic doxa, in order to reveal the process of autonomization of scholarly 
knowledge (i.e., theory) from its own social conditions of possibility. 
 
Because knowledge is a social process, which deploys itself through practice, 
but most of all because people think – not enough attention is paid to the 
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seriousness of this clause – defining what is at stake is part of what is at stake. 
In political philosophy, for instance, pluralism does not refer simply to the 
existence of conflitcting doctrines that exist within a political unit, but also, 
crucially, to alternative and incompatible models of what the very political unit 
is, and where are its boundaries to be drawn. Yet, many philosophical theories 
show serious limitations in their capacity to imagine diversity as a constituent 
part of Europe (Blokker 2006). The same holds for cultural pluralism and 
multiplicity in Europe as imagined by social theory and research. 
 
2. Abymes and vicious circles 
I have devoted some my past research to study the production and circulation 
of the public, mediatic and social-scientific discourse of ‘immigrants 
integration’ in Italy (Brighenti 2004). To make a long story short, one of my 
main arguments is that large part of mainstream debate on migration and 
immigration in Italy – I also attempted some comparisons at the European level 
and concluded that the situation is not radically different when we look at 
Europe in general – is based on an essentialistic conception of socio-cultural 
pluralism. A number of implicit but crucial assumptions are made by 
mainstream research, as well as by the public debate, which remain out of the 
debate itself. One such assumptions, particularly clear in the Italian debate, is 
for instance the postulated equivalence of minority groups and cultural groups: 
‘one minority group equals one socio-cultural profile equals one identity’. 
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Consider for intance the fact that in many European countries, minorities – 
whether immigrant or settled – are routinely classified, in national surveys as 
well as in academic scholarship and in the media, by their national origin. Some 
Italian researchers introduced the expression ‘ethno-national’ groups, 
suggesting that each of these groups shows distinctive and consistent collective 
features. This goes along – and, so to speak, even hand in hand – with the 
discourse of multiculturalism. The interchangeable use of these categories is, to 
put it mildly, far from accurate, as the fault-lines among them do not coincide. 
One minority does not equal to one socio-cultural profile, which does not equal 
to one national citizenship, which does not equal to one social identity. We all 
know things are much more complicated than that, but it seems that seduction 
of the oversimplifying model that portrays cultural diversity in terms of 
paradigms is pervasive and capable of shaping our imagination. 
 
Consequently, I became interested in what I dare to call ‘the implicit ideology of 
paradigms in multiculturalist debates’. By this phrase I mean that, because of 
the projection of an essentialist image upon them, minorities are thought of as 
distinct socio-cultural paradigms. While almost nobody explicitly claims to be 
doing so, a number of theories and scattered comments on social diversity that 
circulate in the media, in public communication and in the scientific community 
implicitly adopt and support the conception of socio-cultural groups as 
paradigms. Once this conception is applied, one can judge it as an independent, 
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objective fact, and even find it good or bad according to one’s political 
orientation and values. But these judgements are mere truisms that depend on 
the starting assumption. Once the paradigmatic interpretation is applied, 
frequently alleged accusations that minority groups tend to become ‘identity 
fortresses’, for instance, are easy to formulate, as they almost amount to saying 
that people belonging to these groups want to be what they are. 
 
3. The Debate on Paradigms 
This is puzzle for contemporary social theory, but, arguably, it bears important 
consequences for the political and legal construction of Europe. In order to 
make my point a little bit clearer, I suggest to retrieve the original conceptual 
tools at stake. Interestingly, all these concepts derive from the epistemological 
debate of the Sixties and Seventies, at a time when neopositivism was having a 
hard time and critical rationalism was in its hey-day. Before researching on 
what are the theoretical implications of portraying social and cultural 
distinctive groups in terms of alternative paradigms however, it must be 
recalled that concepts such as ‘paradigm’ by Kuhn and ‘research programme’ 
by Lakatos, were originally concevied to be applied at a theoretical level, rather 
than at the level of social diversity. 
 
Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1962) observed that history of science is not made of 
simple competition among theories, because more general and comprehensive 
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worldviews are always involved, which take the pride of place. These 
worldviews are ‘implicit set[s] of interlaced theoretical and methodological 
beliefs’ (Kuhn 1962: 36). Kuhn’s is a discontinuist philosophy of science, which 
aims at explaining successive turnovers of these ‘implicit sets of beliefs’, which 
he called paradigms. A paradigm, not only dictates a series of scientific 
postulates – or dogmas (Kuhn 1963), statements not to be questioned – but it also 
and foremostly directs attention towards a series of legitimate problems and 
phenomena to be studied. Thus, a paradigm provides at least: a list of problems 
to be addressed (a problem field), the definitions and the tools to address those 
problems, a set of problem-solving euristics, the criteria to tell whether the 
advanced solutions where effective and acceptable or not. Thus, it is within the 
field designed by a paradigm that scientific problems can be focused, 
circumscribed and coped with. 
 
Substitution of one paradigm with another one is a diachronic process, and the 
paradigmatic shift spans over a relatively limited interval of time. Conflicts 
between paradigms are thought to be interstitial and transitional. Each 
conflictual period marks the boundary of other periods of ‘normal science’, 
defined by the fact that a single paradigm is established and widely accepted by 
the scientific community, which makes it is easy to distinguish orthodoxy from 
heresy. However, paradigms are also affected by anomalies, i.e. minor 
shortcomings that need to be adjusted – at least, until it is possible to do so. 
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When anomalies become unbearable, an unsettled period comes along, which 
puts the paradigm as a whole in crisis. When a paradigm undergoes a crisis, 
alternatives begin to thrive – or better, they become visible, as a crisis could be 
defined simply as the visibility of alternatives, previously crushed by the 
hegemonic framework.  
 
Whereas theories may be incompatible with each other, paradigms are 
incommensurable with each other. Incommensurability is not mere 
incompatibility, as it is not simply the manifestation of a plurality of options or 
affiliations. Incommensurability indeed refers to the lack of a common standard 
for comparison among different options or affiliations. In short, there is no 
neutral standpoint for comparison among incommensurable items. 
Consequently, it is not possible to reach any exhaustive, univocal translation of 
concepts, terms and even research questions through different paradigms. This 
is why paradigmatic transition has been described by Kuhn as a ‘Gestalt re-
orientation’, and even an ‘act of conversion’. In between two paradigms there is 
a logical gap that cannot be rationally filled. 
 
Lakatos reinterpreted paradigms as ‘scientific research programmes’ (Lakatos 
1970). By doing so, he attempted to provide a middle way between old-style 
neopositivist ‘rational reconstructions’ of scientific development and the lack of 
rationale for change suggested by Kuhn. It was a brilliant solution, aimed at 
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bringing pluralism within a rational framework. Whereas Popper’s critical 
rationalism was monotheoric, insofar as it allowed the substitution of a single 
theory with another one, and whereas Kuhn’s irrationalistic model was likewise 
monotheoric, Lakatos recognized the constant proliferation of theories, and the 
tenacy (a quality which may look irrational) their supporters adopt in 
defending them against criticisms. At the same, he stressed that theories do not 
float in a vacuum: they develop within threads of theories marked by a 
distinctive degree of coherent heuristics and methodological continuity. These 
threads he called research programmes. The attempt to retrieve the aspect of 
continuity throughout revolutions is a crucial feature of Lakatos’ philosophy of 
science. 
 
A further, more radical step was made by Feyerabend (1978a; 1999). He refused 
Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ models as fictitious accounts of scientific activity, and 
maintained that there are no general mechanisms to describe the growth of 
scientific knowledge, least of all overarching dominant paradigms. He 
contended that there are only – as I said before – scientists’ personal preferences 
and tastes. ‘What we are facing – he wrote – are not superb cathedrals, but 
falling remains, architectonical monsters whose existence is fatigably prolonged 
by the architects through inelegant props’ (Feyerabend 1978b). Among these 
architectonical remains, the most heterogeneous styles and occasional devices 
are massively used to undertake the construction, thanks to a sort of invenire 
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faciendo that excludes any paradigmatic firmness. One may say that Feyerabend 
combines Lakatos’ acceptance of pluralism with Kuhn’s irrationalist thesis 
(Feyerabend and Lakatos 1999). In other words, the progression Kuhn – Lakatos 
– Feyerabend marks an increasing recognition of pluralism, even at the expense 
of strict criterions for comparison and selection (rationality). 
 
4. The Consequences of Imagining Cultures as Paradigms 
Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend can be seen as three modes of looking at socio-
cultural multiplicity. When we move to the case of Europe in the light of what 
just said, both ideas about clashes of civilization at various levels and scales, 
and arguments about the irreducible diversity of some socio-cultural or national 
groups, can be redescribed as a matter of incommensurability among cultural 
units. The belief in this incommensurability, it is now clear, derives from a rigid 
application of Kuhn’s model to social life. One should also be warned that the 
definitional uniformity of socio-cultural group is not a matter of mere 
intellectual amusement. It is a real social process in itself. How is the continuum 
of socio-cultural details that are irreducible to general categories to be 
constrained and structured into public, well recognizable categories? Public 
categories means visible categories, inasmuch as what is visible is irreflexive and 
perceived as objective. Visible, or public categories are categories that are not 
interpreted or worked upon explicitly, but simply perceived and seen 
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immediately (something similar to the ‘professional vision’ described by 
Goodwin 1994, on a larger scale). 
 
Here we have to face another territorial issue, that of group boundaries. At the 
level of highly general trends, it can be argued that the more group boundaries 
are seen as fixated, the more the situation is configured as a paradigm-based 
one, and, consequently, the more strongly the incommensurability problem 
emerges. Essentialism and fluidism can be thought of as two opposite – but, to an 
extent, complementary – regards on the incommensurability problem. 
Essentialism and fluidism form one of those conceptual pairs which – along 
with agency and structure, individualism and holism, etc. – endlessly face each 
other as matters of theoretical choice, and as expressions of sociological pathos. 
Whereas for the essentialists, belonging is objectively defined, for the fluidists it 
is situationally deployed. A very intereting question is the one asked by 
Francisco Gil-White (1999): ‘If ethnic actors are primordialists, what remains of 
the circumstantialist/primordialist controversy?’. In other words, how do socio-
cultural actors, not simply behave in a certain way and draw group boundaries 
in a certain way, but also conceive of themselves while doing so? Please note 
that I am not interested in the first place in the empirical verification of the 
hypothetic conditions posited by Gil-White. In fact, we may as well legitimately 
ask: ‘If ethnic actors are circumstantialists, what remains of the 
circumstantialist/primordialist controversy?’. We will probably always find 
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that some actors are circumstantialists while some others are primordialists, 
that some admit to be primordialists or circumstantialists and some others do 
not. The point, however, is not simply about ideological statements made by 
people for their group affiliation, but rather about the subtle interweaving of 
practice and theory, and precisely of lay practice and lay theory. What counts is 
who and how, in each situated context, orient her/himself with local, 
endogenous categories and theories, while claiming to adopt those categories 
and theories as described in their own terms. It is the resulting balance of forces 
in these orientations and declarations that guide people’s positioning along 
boundaries, which in the first place they have to draw in some way, that 
ultimately shapes the distribution of majorities and respective minorities. This 
resulting balance of forces, in other words, determines not only the well-known 
fact, that inside each majority is entrapped some minority, but also the less 
recognized and far more insidious fact that inside each minority, there lurks a 
majority. 
 
In conclusion, I would like to give some hints about the implications of 
imagining theories of multiplicity and socio-cultural diversity as paradigms in 
the European context. Here, again, we find issues of boundary-making, 
incommensurability and visibility. But at the level of theory-making, closure 
and incommensurability seem to be linked mainly to disciplinary and 
methodological differences, and maybe more subtly to value differences. 
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Besides that, when theories of pluralism are observed as paradigms, a sort of 
mise en abyme occurs: theories as (second order) paradigms about paradigms 
(cultural groups). This may look terribly complex, but it is even more so, and 
accordingly more real, if we accept that the two levels, that of theory-making 
and that of social processes of heterogeneity, diversity and multiplicity, cannot 
be separated from each other. From this point of view, theory-making is very 
much a distributed social activity, no less territorial than culture: both can be seen 
in their double aspect of boundary-making and bridge-making activities. 
 
The aim of this paper has been to suggest that the debate on the legal and 
political construction of Europe could take advantage of an argument that 
appears most clearly in the fields of culture and social theory: there is no 
heterogeneity, diversity or multiplicity apart from the ways in which we 
imagine them. Tenacy and matters of taste, as Lakatos and Feyerabend called 
these ways of imagining, are part of the game, not in an individualistic manner, 
but in a fully social one. The theorist of social and cultural diversity and of 
social and cultural change is, in a way, condemned to be a spokesperson. And the 
question is: a spokesperson of whom? Well, first of all of herself/himself. And 
then, of whom else? She will be best able to discover it the more she will be able 
to develop her sociological imagination, to link her own biography to history, to 
understand her own social position, her political and scientific value 
orientations as part of what she is as part of what she is talking about in terms 
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of socio-cultural groups, boundaries and minorities. Finally, I think that this 
mise en abyme is recognizable if we renounce to the scientistic view that calls for 
theories of socio-cultural heterogeneity, diversity and multiplicity, and if we 
focus instead on tactically deployable and recursively applicable observative 
and interpretive concepts. 
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